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ABSTRACT 
since the abolition of government support policies for both 
agricultural and financial industries during the early 1980s, 
participants have had to take direct responsibility for the 
management of the risks involved in their business activity. 
As a prerequisite to the development of practical risk 
management strategies and techniques, quantification of risk is 
considered by this thesis. 
A quantification risk index that incorporates both the third 
and fourth moments of a distribution, thus adding to variance 
and monotonic transformations, the traditional surrogate risk 
measures, was developed and applied to sheep and beef farming. 
The risk index is developed using logit analysis, where risk is 
directly estimated. Logit analysis was used because it suited 
the thesis definition of risk. In this thesis, risk is defined 
as the probability of incurring loss or harm, where loss or 
harm is defined, in the context of sheep and beef farming, as 
zero or less than zero 'net cash returns'. Net cash returns 
are defined as all cash revenues generated by farm production 
less all farm and farmer expenditures. The index, or 
probability, is directly estimated given forecast average 
market prices, effective farm area, total farmer forecast 
expenditures and island location (North or South). 
The risk index has been developed for banker application to 
farm budgets submitted for the purposes of seasonal finance 
approval. The banker is warned by the index that the proposed 
farm plan has a high probability of ending in farm insolvency 
and an inability of the farmer to service all lending in the 
forthcoming year, solely from farm production. 
As a consequence of applying the measure to sheep and beef 
farming, the thesis found that in terms of risk to net cash 
returns, effective farm area in conjunction with total farmer 
expenditure is significantly ranked higher than fluctuating 
market product prices, and that risk trade-offs exist between 
farm area and expenditures. In a situation of small farm size 
with relatively high expenditures, optimistic product prices 
are insufficient to offset the high probability of incurring 
negative net cash returns. 
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Chapt;er one 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR AND RISK 
1.1.1 BACKGROUND 
New Zealand agriculture has undergone considerable change in 
direction over the past thirty years. After the relative 
stability but slow general economic growth of the 1960s, the 
1970s saw the evolution of a combination of government policies 
designed to initially stimulate economic growth and later, 
after an OPEC driven redistribution of the world's income in 
its favour, protect export agricultural production from the 
sudden consequential market contraction of industrialised and 
oil importing countries, and the associated long term price 
decline in the international commodity market (Hawke 1987). 
Reaction to depressed international prices for agricultural 
commodities included the supplementation of dwindling producer 
incomes, a policy that was in addition to a growing list of 
regulatory and interventionist measures designed to compensate 
agriculture for the costs of import protection and of 
maintaining an over-valued exchange rate (Hawke 1987). 
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By 1984 the interventions in place consisted of direct input 
subsidies (fertiliser, irrigation, interest), production 
subsidies (supplementary minimum prices), development schemes 
(livestock incentive scheme, land development encouragement 
loan), the provision of research and farm services, producer 
board subsidies, taxation exemptions, industry controls and 
producer board legislation, as well as state ownership of the 
rural banking and finance corporation. The 1984 total fiscal 
cost of these interventions were estimated to be 3.2 percent of 
gross domestic product (GDP), or $1,087 million. (Raynor 1987). 
Under this 'protectionist' environment, producers and agri-
service industries protected from the business risks associated 
with international trade had little incentive to adapt to a 
changing international commodity market, let alone implement 
systems of business risk management at the micro level. The 
early 1980s saw the recognition that the international downturn 
was not short term, resource utilisation inefficiencies had 
developed within the economy, overseas borrowing was not 
sustainable and those in agri-business at all levels had to 
directly confront the realities of the international 
marketplace if they were to quickly adjust to the international 
environment (Hawke 1987). 
As a consequence, protectionist policies were removed by the 
new Labour government elected in 1984. The result has been the 
removal of those many anomalies that encouraged inefficient use 
of resources (Pryde,Bain 1985). Since that period the majority 
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of businesses involved in agricultural activity have had to 
directly face the undisguised risks associated with their 
involvement. Given that risk is a predominant feature of all 
agricultural activity, and agri-business must now take direct 
responsibility for risk, there is now demand for practical 
systems of risk evaluation and management. 
1.1.2 AGRICULTURAL RISK 
Within portfolio theory, risk is seen as being comprised of 
both systematic and nonsystematic elements, i.e. , 
nondiversifiable and diversifiable. This concept tries to 
divide risk into those risk components that are inherent in all 
agricultural activity (systematic), and those Fisk elements 
that are able to be eliminated through diversification into 
other investment options. Turvey and Driver (1986) in a study 
designed to determine the extent of systematic and 
nonsystematic risk within United States agriculture, concluded 
that there is in fact a great deal of systematic risk in 
agriculture and the proportion of local and specific risk that 
can be diversified away is small, relative to the total risk of 
the farm sector portfolio. 
Opportunities for diversification from one generic type of 
agriculture into a better alternative are limited by the 
constraints imposed by all manner of resource factors. For 
instance, a change from Merino sheep farming to intensive 
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horticulture may not be feasible due to the absence of those 
basic physical resources, required by horticulture, such as 
soil type or appropriate climate. 
Given the range of physical resources that are available to any 
specific farmer, the product option range within generic types 
of agriculture is also limited by their comparative suitability 
to those resources. For example Romney sheep would be less 
suited to South Island high country conditions than Merino 
sheep. 
Once a farmer is committed to a production decision, his 
options diminish as he draws nearer to harvest. For instance, 
an arable crop farmer may harvest peas in either their green 
state, as fresh peas, or in their dry seed state. Once the 
time has passed for green pea harvest, the farmer is committed 
to the dry pea market. 
Agricultural risk and uncertainty can be further divided into 
business or financial risk, where business risk can be further 
categorised according to three sources (Just 1975). First, 
risk can be associated with environmental factors such as 
climate, disease, pest infestation and technological 
obsolescence. Second, risk can arise from market factors such 
as supply and demand disequilibrium within both input and 
output markets, and competitive elements associated with market 
structure. Third, risk can occur from government policy and 
programs, such as support levels and regulations, as well as 
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government priorities with regard to economic objectives. 
During the season of production, from investment to harvest, a 
farmer must not only endure the risks and uncertainties 
associated with any probable change in, or occurrence of, any 
of the above risk sources, but also the risks associated with 
their resulting impact or outcome. 
The risk incurred as a consequence of a change in any of the 
above risk elements within the three source categories can vary 
across the national agricultural economy. Each risk source has 
a regional qualification. For example, the probability, or 
risk, of drought on the East Coast is greater than on the West; 
the risk associated with local price fluctuations for market 
garden produce are less in the Auckland region than in the 
Invercargil region. 
Risk can also vary according to the 'additive' or cumulative 
combination of separate risk sources within regions. For 
example, the perceived risk to, or impact on, cashflows as a 
consequence of the 1984 SMP removal phase of government policy 
would have been greater in the Canterbury region than in the 
West Coast region because Canterbury is much more prone to 
prolonged drought, meaning that cashflows were already at risk 
prior to SMP removal. The implication is that the level of 
risk associated with the occurrence of any specific stimuli on 
any generic agricultural activity in any particular region 
differs from other regions according to the combined 
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probability of risk stimuli occurring concurrently at any point 
in time. 
The level of risk might be determined by the impact of any 
stimuli rather than the probable occurrence of stimuli. More 
specifically, the concept of risk might be more appropriately 
associated with the probable impact of say a large price 
decrease rather than the occurrence of such a decrease. Total 
risk within a farm unit describes the combined probable impact 
upon the security of the farm unit, of the occurrence of any 
combination of stimuli. 
Amongst those industries that service agricultural production, 
banking is the industry that is an important prerequisite agri-
service input common to all agricultural and aquacultural 
production and associated activities. This fact makes 
agricultural production dependent on the security and risk 
exposure perceptions that a bank may have with regard to 
agricultural finance involvement. A bank is in a position to 
determine the productive longevity of any individual producer, 
using its ability to either invest or disinvest in its farmer 
client. 
As a consequence, a feature of agricultural risk, from a 
producer's point of view, is the financier's reaction to the 
impact upon the producer of any adverse change in any risky 
factor. This form of risk can be categorised as financial 
risk, and is best described by the following scenario. 
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Assume that during October a sheep farmer has entered an 
unexpected drought period. Further, his June negotiated 
seasonal overdraft facility requires that he receives better 
than average prices for his produce and his expenditure be at 
a controlled minimum level. The farmer's overdraft includes a 
drought allowance that facilitates the purchase of a small 
quantity of stock feed should it be required. overall this 
farmer's debt equity ratio is dangerously large but his current 
account deficit not unusually large for this time of the year. 
He is classified by the bank as being a 'security borderline' 
client. 
As the drought progresses into January, it becomes apparent 
that the stock feed allowance will need to be spent, and an 
'insufficient' quantity of feed barley is purchased due to the 
unit price paid being beyond budget expectation as a 
consequence of the high regional demand for feed barley, 
generated by the drought. Further, he sells a large proportion 
of his prime lambs earlier than expected, to ease the immediate 
stock demand for pasture, at prices less than budget 
expectations. 
The farmer believes he has reacted sensibly to h~s situation, 
in that he is implementing decisions designed to protect his 
future production from the impact of the drought, thus 
minimising his long-term loss. His concern centres around 
controlling the weight loss of his ewes prior to mating and 
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shearing, as well as maintaining a small weight gain in his 
replacement ewe lambs. He is also concerned with reducing his 
short term loss by selling lambs before the market further 
worsens. 
As a consequence of his early sale of lambs and delayed 
purchase of stock feed, his overdraft facility is now certain 
of being exceeded. At this point he visits his bank manager 
with an application to extend his current account overdraft 
facility. He believes that he was justified in selling his 
lambs early, as they would not have reached budget target 
1 i veweights and grades under the circumstances, and pr ices 
offered by the meat companies were worsening as a consequence 
of the unusually high regional supply of lambs from farmers 
concurrently wishing to sell lambs early. 
Although it is certain that the farmer will sustain an 
accounting loss and show a consequential deterioration in his 
equity position, if the bank is prepared to accommodate the 
overdraft extension then, from the farmer's point of view, the 
impact of the drought will not be so bad. The farmer has no 
idea how the bank will react to his application, and considers 
a possible adverse bank reaction to his plight as an additional 
risk component within the total risk of drought and its final 
impact. Should the bank not accept his reasoning and 'harden' 
their position, then the final impact of the drought on this 
farmer would be particularly harmful. 
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The above scenario serves to illustrate two points. First it 
conveys the concept that risk in agriculture is not only 
related to the impact on cash outcomes of various 
uncontrollable stimuli, whatever they may be, but also that the 
severity, or level of risk again differs according to the 
impact that the resulting cash outcome may have on the 
attitudes and business decisions of those financing 
agriculture, and their consequential influence on the ability 
of the farmer to continue farming. Second, financiers of 
agricultural production, once committed to a level of financial 
involvement, either run the risk of inadvertently underwriting 
those components of agricultural business risk they feel 
uncomfortable with, or be requested to do so, thus placing them 
in the unenviable position of having to decide whether or not 
to exert great pressure on their client. 
Agricultural risk is multi-dimensional in terms of its wide 
range of source stimuli, and the variability across farmers and 
regions of the impact that those stimuli may have on the farm 
unit. Although sources of risk can be categorised and the 
probability of those source stimuli occurring are known, the 
quantifiable level of risk itself, or the impact of those 
stimuli, is not known. Risk can only be described according to 
the consequential harmful impact of the occurrence of any 
uncontrollable agricultural characteristic. 
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1.2 THE FINANCIAL SECTOR AND RISK 
1.2.1 BACKGROUND 
At the time the Labour party came to government office during 
1984, New Zealand's financial sector was the most regulated in 
the Western world. Since 1984, the financial sector has been 
completely overhauled. The removal of blanket regulations 
controlling lending and deposit rates and the abolition of the 
penal marginal ratios to financial institutions preceded the 
revocation of both the 30 day rule, which had prevented the 
trading and savings banks from entering the short end of the 
money market, and the 3 percent interest rate restriction on 
the ordinary accounts of savings banks. The removal of credit 
growth guidelines, foreign exchange controls and the 
liberalisation of bank registration were also introduced to 
increase competition and efficiency in the financial system. 
With the ability to borrow or lend offshore, and substantial 
changes to the system of tendering for Treasury·bills, banks 
are now in a position to openly compete for custom (Russell 
1985) . 
Deregulation has seen an increase in the number of banks from 
the major four in 1984 to over 20 in 1990. A growing trend is 
the number of mergers into large supermarket type banks 
offering a wide range of financial services. Smaller banks are 
emerging as niche banks, filling the gaps left by major 
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1.2.2 THE ROLE OF THE TRADING BANK 
Whilst it is difficult to be precise in defining a 'bank' or 
banking business, a financial institution is part of the 
banking system if its main functions include the acceptance of 
demand deposits, the operation of money transfer, and the 
creation of demand deposits through the making of loans and 
provision of overdraft credit (Deane 1982). 
It is the ability of trading and commercial banks to create 
money in the form of demand deposits by making loans and 
extending credit, that distinguishes them from other financial 
institutions. The creation of deposits can continue so long as 
banks hold sufficient currency and reserves to meet regulatory 
requirements and to redeem whatever amounts the holders of 
deposits want to convert to currency (Crosse 1979). The money 
a bank can lend or invest, at any point in time, is its excess 
of cash and bank balances over required reserves and minimum 
cash requirements, according to its daily balance sheet. The 
bank must stand ready to pay out the deposits it creates when 
it makes new loans or extends overdraft facilities. 
The creation of demand deposits through overdraft extension is 
particularly suited to the characteristics of • agricultural 
production. By supplying liquidity to producers, through their 
ability to lend and invest, they are able to provide money, at 
a cost, in consideration of assets or effort that have a future 
money value. 
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Given that the creation of deposits through lending is directly 
related to their depository function, i.e., the demand deposits 
that constitute the major portion of the money.supply, then 
their ability to create deposits is constrained by not only the 
willingness of customers to deposit funds, but also by the 
total pool of funds available for deposit. 
Where the pool of funds available for deposit is itself 
constrained and a major proportion of those deposits is 
transacted for consumption, i.e. , they are short duration 
deposits, then the bank has the essential role of apportioning 
or rationing the available long term deposits, as credit, to 
what it perceives as being the most efficient users of that 
credit. 
1.2.3 RISK IN BANKING 
Risk within the banking industry can be categorised according 
to four basic sources. First, market risk broadly consists of 
elements such as the general state of the economy and 
competition within the banking industry. Second, political 
risk includes that risk inherent in changes of government 
policy as well as the internal management politics often found 
within large corporations and their boards of directors. Both 
of these categories can be included within the broad category 
of business risk. 
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The third category, deposit risk, identifies the risks 
associated with the liability side of a bank's balance sheet. 
Demand deposits present risk according to both the term and 
size of the deposit. On call deposits present the greatest 
risk within this category. Deposit risk is included within 
financial risk, along with the fourth category, credit or 
default risk, which describes those risks associated with the 
asset side of a bank's balance sheet. The non-payment of 
either a loan principal at maturity or interest at any stage 
during the term of a loan are the main sources of this type of 
risk. 
Default risk is the main emphasis of this thesis and, as the 
title suggests, concentrates on the short term seasonal 
provision of working capital to agricultural producers. 
Risk is a banker's preoccupation. If loans are not repaid then 
the banker in turn will not be able to meet his commitments. 
In this way both deposit and default risk are linked. Risk is 
inherent in the choice of borrower; risk is implicit in the 
industry being financed; risk by the business to which the 
banker may grant too much or too little credit; risk which 
involves the whole economy; a gambler's risk with weather, 
geography, technology and politics (Camu 1977). 
In making innumerable loans to thousands of undertakings of all 
sizes, large banks are able to protect themselves against at 
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least the consequences of risk, if not against risk itself. 
The banker covers himself against risk by guarantees and 
securities with solid legal backing (Camu 1977). 
A bank manager faced with a request for loan or overdraft 
facility is generally concerned with the answers to four basic 
questions: 
(i) How much does the customer want to borrow? 
(ii) What does he want it for? 
(iii) How long does he want it for? 
(iv) How is it to be repaid? 
The four questions are all related to the security aspects of 
minimising default risk. Although security is not often 
directly questioned, it underlies the reason for asking these 
questions in the first place (Cox 1979). 
The 'how much' question establishes not only the ability of the 
bank to feasibly provide such amount according to its current 
balance of excess demand deposits, but also to ascertain the 
ratio between what the customer himself is providing against 
what the bank is being asked to provide. Bank policy generally 
determines a maximum provision ratio according to the 
realisable value of the asset being financed, and ensures some 
equity to the borrower thus guaranteeing a collateral for the 
loan (Cox 1979). 
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For short term finance, as well as long term finance, the 'how 
much' question relates to the 'what for' question. This 
question is related to the credit use issue where the manager 
is attempting to establish the security parameters of his 
involvement. Is the activity high risk, i.e., is it 
speculative? Will the activity generate a sustainable interest 
yield? Will the amount requested hinder the ability of the 
operation to preform to expectation in terms of loan servicing? 
Are the characteristics of the operation such that it is 
vulnerable to a whole range of uncontrollable influences? Is 
the customer sufficiently knowledgable of the operation? 
This question also begins to address the security question 
directly. What assets will be used as collateral for the loan? 
Do these assets have a realisable value, and how easy are these 
assets 'cashed in'? For seasonal finance, future production is 
sufficient collateral if the value of future production exceeds 
the value of the seasonal finance (Cox 1979). 
Because the bank's current liability constitutes short term 
notice of demand deposit payment, it makes good sense to have 
loans out on a short term basis. The 'how long' question 
relates the term and type of loan to the nature of its intended 
use. 
The 'how is it to be repaid' question is related to how the 
loan will provide for future operation earnings. Will the 
nature of the operation provide sufficient future profit from 
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which the loan can be repaid? Will repayments be such that 
they ensure regular cash flow to the bank, i.e., will payments 
be monthly etc.? Will the loan realise a regular yield, or 
will the return from the loan occur at some future date? (Cox 
1979) . 
Apart from answers to the above questions, other factors play 
a vital part in linking together the answers to the four basic 
questions when evaluating the loan application. One highly 
variable factor is the customer. A bank manager must get to 
know his customer's health, age, activity and the value of 
connected family and business accounts held at the branch. 
This is vital information to the manager (Cox 1979). It serves 
to not only indicate to the bank manager any possible sources 
of default risk, but also the extent of possible guarantees and 
securities that are at his disposal. His objective is to 
increase bank assets by lending to earn interest revenue and in 
so doing, help the customer by providing a loan with such 
security that the risks are minimised for both parties (Cox 
1979) . 
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1.3 THE THESIS DEFINITION OF RISK 
1.3.1 RISK DEFINED 
Risk is not an observable entity - it is a concept verbally 
defined by Websters dictionary as 'the chance of injury, damage 
or loss' . Al though the verbal definition is intuitively 
appealing, it would not appear to lend itself well to 
measurement and analysis. It is therefore desirable to develop 
a surrogate for the dictionary definition of risk that is 
amenable to quantification. For it to be intuitively pleasing 
it must measure, either directly or indirectly 'the chance of 
injury, damage or loss, so that it may be used synonymously 
with the word risk (Francis 1986). 
More generally in analysis, risk is defined as being described 
by a known probability distribution of a particular event 
occurring, in contrast to uncertainty where the probabilities 
are unknown, with the surrogate measure of risk involving the 
variability, or some monotonic transformation, of that 
distribution. The greater the variation of that distribution 
then the greater is the risk of that particular event not 
occurring (Van Horne 1981). 
Although risk and uncertainty are frequently used 
interchangeably, no distinction is made between the two in this 
research. They are conceptually seen as describing the same 
probability of loss or harm. 
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The elements of doubtfulness, 
fickleness or changeability that characterise uncertainty can 
be described just as much by a subjective probability 
distribution as can risk by an objective probability 
distribution (Francis 1986). As such, uncertainty is not 
recognised as being distinctly different from · risk in the 
context of this thesis. 
There needs to be a clear distinction between the risk of a 
source stimuli as an event occurring, and the risk of an 
adverse or harmful result occurring as a consequence of that 
source event. For instance, we can refer to 'the chance, 
probability or risk' of an event such as a drought or price 
crash occurring, or we can refer to 'the chance, probability or 
risk' that the occurrence of a drought or price crash will be 
harmful, where harm itself is considered the event. 
Two aspects of the verbal definition for risk require 
clarification and definition. First 'chance' and second 
'damage, loss or harm'. Chance is easily interchangeable with 
probability. In the context of the risk definition, chance, 
possibility, probability and odds are synonymous. Therefore 
the definition can be altered to 'the probability of damage, 
loss or harm', where probability is indeed either objectively 
or subjectively quantifiable. 
In order to define 'harm' as an event, in the context of the 
thesis definition for risk, one must pull to_gether those 
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aspects of both agricultural and banking risk, discussed 
earlier, that are identifiably common to both. 
It has been indicated earlier that the level of agricultural 
risk inherent in the occurrence of a source stimuli varied 
according to the impact that resulted. Regardless of the 
source of that risk, the final impact of any source component 
of agricultural business risk is ultimately reflected in either 
a change in farm revenues or a change in farm expenditures, or 
both. An adverse impact would obviously consist of either a 
decrease in farm revenue or an increase in farm expenditures. 
More precisely, an adverse impact would be reflected in a 
decrease in farm profit, the magnitude of which essentially 
determines the magnitude of the financial risk inherent in that 
specific agricultural activity, through the effect that the 
decrease in profits has on farmer equity. Therefore the 
ultimate impact of any combination of business risk stimuli is 
itself a source of financial risk. 
However a small decrease in farm profits, or equity, is not 
harmful if 'sufficient' profit and equity remain after the 
impact, but is harmful if little equity existed beforehand, and 
a financial loss resulted rather than a profit, thus causing 
negative equity. In this situation the financial loss would 
not only increase the default risk the bank first undertook in 
financing the operation, in terms of interest default on both 
long and short term loans and repayment of seasonal loans, but 
would also threaten the security underlying the total financing 
of the farm. 
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If the situation were such that default did in 
fact occur then the situation would also constitute harm to the 
bank. 
The commonality between agricultural and banking risk is 
therefore identified within one financial risk component of 
both entities, i.e., the profit component of farmer equity 
within the financial risk inherent in the farm operation and 
the default risk component of the financial risks inherent in 
banking. Joint, or common 'harm' can therefore be defined as 
'zero or negative farm profit'. 
The thesis definition of risk, which is also tantamount to a 
definition for default risk, within the context of short term 
seasonal financing of agricultural production, then becomes 
'the probability of zero or negative farm profit', where zero 
or negative farm profit is assumed to be a jointly harmful 
event. 
One more component of the thesis definition argument needs to 
be examined before a true link between farm financial risk and 
bank default risk can be established. It is contained within 
the definition of 'farm profit', and the implications 
associated with the accounting definition of farm profit. 
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1.3.2 FARM PROFIT AND THE CURRENT ACCOUNT 
By far the largest proportion of trading bank gross operating 
revenue consists of interest income. The Bank of New Zealand 
group reported in its 1990 consolidated profit and loss 
statement that it received eighty percent of its gross revenue 
through interest earnings, and fifty percent of its total 
operating income from net interest income, net of interest 
payments (Bank of New Zealand 1990). Bank profit is therefore 
determined by the relative interest magnitudes of both assets, 
in the form of advances, investments and securities, and 
liability deposits. 
Two characteristics of interest revenue are important in the 
context of risk. First, interest is essentially a cash revenue 
sourced as cash payments made by the lender from revenues 
derived by the activities the bank is financing. Second, the 
duration of that interest revenue is related to both the 
solvency of the lender, or his ability to continue servicing 
the loan, and the security underlying the loan in relation to 
its term. 
From a bank revenue point of view, solvency would seem to be a 
more important component of minimising total default risk than 
would security. If the activity being financed is strong 
enough to provide, or guarantee, the ongoing servicing 
requirements of the loan, but has poor financial security in 
terms of that loan, then so long as that security improves over 
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time as a consequence of the activity's strength, it would seem 
rational for the bank to continue its involvement. 
Assuming that lender solvency is a dominant characteristic of 
continued bank involvement, and security is a dominant 
characteristic, or pre-condition, for initial loan provision, 
and both solvency and security are related via the financial 
strength of the activity, then it follows that from both the 
bank and farmer point of view, cash flow, or cash solvency, is 
the dominant criteria upon which default risk should be 
evaluated. 
In terms of monitoring and measuring the default risk of bank 
involvement, then 
effective way of 
monitoring the current account is the only 
gaining information regarding the cash 
strength or solvency of the borrower. Current account is 
defined as the sum of all accounts, bank or otherwise, through 
which all cash transactions are made. For this reason, and 
because solvency is related to cash, the normal reporting 
format of farm accounting needs to be adapted to accommodate 
the thesis definition of risk. 
The recommended format for farm accounting, as outlined by the 
New Zealand Society of Accountants 1985, is diagrammatically 
abbreviated in Figure 1.1. 
With the emphasis on cash flow, the need for re-defining 'farm 
profit• becomes apparent when one notices the combination of 
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Figure 1.1 Farm Accounts 
tangible objective cash items with comparatively intangible 
subjective values throughout these accounts. Cash surplus from 
farming is a true cash definition which is adjusted according 
to changes in livestock values and depreciation to derive net 
farming profit. 
The cash flow statement, although a true cash definition, 
incorporates injections of loan capital or advances, which 
confuses the issue of cash solvency in terms of interest 
payments derived from the 'strength of the enterprise'. Cash 
injections of borrowed capital, if used to repay seasonal debt, 
also confuses the issue of seasonal finance secured by future 
farm production. The use of cash injections, whilst 
constituting a cash flow transaction through a current account, 
also increases both the liabilities and assets of the balance 
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sheet (depending on whether or not capital is purchased with 
the injection) therefore directly influencing the equity 
security issue within default risk. 
By separating out all intangible subjective components of the 
farm accounts, as well as removing external cash injections 
other than earned revenue, we are left with a net cash position 
that is related more to the capacity of the individual and his 
farm to earn sufficient revenue such that he can be defined as 
being 'productively sol vent and secure' . As • such we are 
attempting to separate out those cash components of the farm 
operation that directly relate to 'farm solvency' and 
distinguish between lending to achieve solvency and earning to 
achieve solvency. 
The relationship between solvency and security is identified 
diagrammatically in Figure 1. 2. Assuming that security is 
defined as percentage equity, where equity represents the 
proportion of the capital account to total assets, then one can 
clearly see from the diagram how important a positive cash flow 
is in relation to equity and security. 
The diagram is not meant to show the relative magnitudes of the 
effect of changes in any of the accounting components, nor does 
it show the off-sets with regard to changes in 'below the 
dashed line' intangible components caused by changes in the 
'above the dashed line' tangible components. It merely tries 
to establish the relationship between tangible cash components 
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Figure 1.2 Cash balance 
and equity. The diagram also indicates the sensitive balance 
between asset values, and adjustments, farm cash flow and cash 
profit, and the balance sheet components. 
In the context of the thesis definition for risk, we define 
risk inherent in the provision of seasonal finance to 
agriculture as being ' the probability of incurring zero or 
negative net cash returns' where net cash returns are defined 
as being 'the sum of all revenues earned by the farmer on the 
farm less all cash expenses and payments made by the farmer'. 
The risk so described refers to the risk of insolvency and the 
inability of a farmer to service the sum total of all 
borrowing. This definition links together the two common 
financial risk components of agriculture and banking. 
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1.4 SEASONAL CREDIT AND THE NEED FOR RISK QUANTIFICATION 
1.4.1 THE EQUITY PROBLEM 
Amongst the many repercussions on the rural sector of the 
removal of agricultural support policies during the early 
1980s, was a general 'across the board' loss of farmer equity. 
With government support and protection having been capitalised 
into land values prior to 1984, their removal almost 
immediately decreased land values and, as a consequence, farmer 
equity levels (Pryde 1987). Compounded by decreased product 
prices, many farmers found themselves sustaining and servicing 
debt levels with little or no underlying security. 
CANTERBURY FARM EQUITY 
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Figure 1.3 Canterbury farmer equity Source: Pryde 1987. 
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Evidence supporting a general loss of equity can be found in 
Pryde' s 1987 analysis of the equity levels for a sample of 
Canterbury farmers. Figure 1.3 shows that during 
the period 1984 to 1986 inclusive, the sample distributions of 
farm equity changed from left skewed exponential to bimodal. 
The interesting feature of his analysis is that although all 
farm equity levels had dropped, by 1986 the distribution showed 
that no farmer in the survey had an equity of between 10% and 
20%, and 11% of farmers had equity levels of less than 0 ~ 0. 
Pryde' s analysis also shows that in the period 1983/84 to 
1985/86 the percentage of Canterbury farmers with 50% or less 
equity had grown from 13% to 35%. 
Pryde's analysis is also supported by the 1984/85 to 1988/89 
equity distributions, displayed in Figure 1.4, of a national 
sample of sheep and beef farmers taken annually by the New 
Zealand Meat and Wool Board's Economic service. 
This distribution illustration also indicates a sudden 1986 
increase in the percentage of sheep and beef farmers with zero 
or negative equity levels. For the 1984/85 season only 0.2% of 
sheep and beef farmers were in this category. By the end of 
the 1985/86 season, the percentage of farmers in the negative 
equity category had increased to 3.7% of the sample, inferring 
that some 800 sheep and beef farmers, among approximately 
22,000 sheep and beef farmers at that time, had absolutely no 
financial equity security, and the percentage of sheep and beef 
farmers with 50% or less equity had grown from 7.9% to 20.8%. 
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Figure 1.4 Sheep and beef Farmer Equity Source: M.W.B.E.S 
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By the end of the 1988/89 season the percentage of negative 
equity farmers had improved to 2%. 
In discussions with numerous financial advisors, Pryde found 
that in assessing the financial situation of farmers, they now 
paid no attention to averages, and less attention to equity. 
Farmers are categorised into 'boxes' that depict distinct 
situations (Pryde 1987). In a typical cross-section of 
Canterbury farmers, 6% were in deep financial trouble, and had 
been for at least ten years, 21% were in trouble but probably 
could recover under favourable conditions, 49% were described 
as struggling, having been caught by their level of borrowing, 
and 24% were described as 'very sound'. 
If we consider just the first 'box', 6% in serious trouble, in 
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just Canterbury alone, there were between 300 - 400 farmers in 
this predicament (Pryde 1987). Over the country this may 
conservatively be estimated at between 4000 - 5000 farmers. 
Further, the total agricultural debt at 1987 was estimated to 
be about $8 billion. With an average indebtedness of 
approximately $150,000, this equates to a total of between $600 
million and $750 million of at risk farm debt, and this is for 
only 6% of the total farmer population. It is unlikely that by 
1991 the situation is much improved, despite the improvement 
noted in Figure 1.4. Note that the distributions also infer 
that banks must indeed be currently financing at least 1.5% of 
farmers with no equity security. 
Although Pryde's research describes only the Canterbury 
experience, it seems probable, according to figure 1.4, that 
similar equity situations occurred throughout New Zealand. 
Pryde' s 1987 survey of financial advisors and · institutions 
revealed a profile of the type of farmer affected by financial 
difficulties. His list of characteristics, abbreviated below, 
would appear to be generally applicable. 
Characteristics of farmers in financial difficulty: 
1. The standard of resource management is generally poor. 
2. Working expenses exceed a certain proportion of income. 
3. A lack of economies of size and scale. 
4. Excessive levels of personal drawings. 
32 
1.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The current environment within which both farmers and bankers 
conduct their business demands a more direct responsibility for 
the management of risk. Given the unique business risks 
inherent in agricultural activity, plus a need for bankers to 
avoid involvement in farm plans that increase the risk of loan 
servicing and repayment default and the adverse consequences of 
default occurring, specific agricultural risk needs to be 
measured before risk management strategies can be developed and 
implemented. 
The specific agricultural risk to be measured is defined as 
'the probability of a farmer client incurring zero or negative 
net cash returns ' . A client that conducts a farm activity 
which results in a negative cash position after one season of 
operation, is deemed to be unable to totally service existing 
debt. A pre-condition of servicing is that funds available for 
servicing must be sourced from earned activity and not 
borrowed. 
Net cash returns are defined as consisting of all earned gross 
cash revenues less all farm and personal cash expenditures. 
The proposed cash transactions, or farm budget, conducted 
through the farmer's current account, excluding injections of 
borrowed capital, will be utilised in the quantification of 
default risk. 
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Measuring the probable inability for an activity to service 
debt constitutes a warning mechanism with regard to lending 
secured by farmer equity. Avoidance of the repercussions, on 
both banker and farmer, of loan interest and repayment default 
underlie the objectives of such a measurement. 
1.6 THESIS OBJECTIVES 
The first objective of this thesis is to quantify the default 
risk of seasonally financing agricultural production according 
to the definition 'the probability of zero or negative net cash 
returns'. It is intended that the probability be directly 
estimated utilising the probability modelling technique of 
logit analysis, and applied to the dominant components of sheep 
and beef farming. 
The second objective is to concurrently develop a method for 
combining multiple farming activities such that the resulting 
risk measure refers to an individual farmer client involved in 
any combination of those activities. 
1.7 THESIS ORGANISATION 
Chapter One has described the background and associated need 
for the measurement of a specific type of risk common to both 
farmers and bankers, and has identified and defined that risk. 
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Chapter Two evaluates traditional risk measurement techniques 
for their general suitability as a risk measure. Chapter Three 
presents and describes probability modelling techniques. 
Chapter Four describes and defines the variables used in the 
modelling process, as well as describes the data used in the 
construction of the variables. Chapters Five through Seven 
specify the legit model and report the results of model 
building and testing. 
The thesis concludes with Chapter Eight, which discusses the 
results, strengths and weaknesses of the model, as well as a 
framework within which the model could be utilised. 
Limitations and problems encountered in this inalysis will 
indicate areas for further research. 
